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Abstract 
Recent studies in collective memory point to the emergence of cosmopolitan commemoration that takes humanity, 
rather than nationality, as a primary frame of reference. But these studies have yet to specify how cosmopolitan 
commemoration emerges and articulates with existing nationalist commemoration. To solve this problem, we 
examine the “history problem” between Japan and South Korea by focusing on how relevant political and civic 
actors negotiated cosmopolitanism and nationalism in commemorating Japan’s past colonial rule and wartime 
atrocities. In light of our historical analysis, we argue that a synthesis of theories of institutional logics and social 
movements is useful in illuminating how the emergence of cosmopolitan commemoration is embedded in specific 
networks of political and civic actors as mobilizing structures, and how the content and trajectory of its 
articulation with nationalist commemoration depends on political opportunities available to competing networks 
aligned differently with the two logics of commemoration. 
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Over the last two centuries, nationalism—a political doctrine and cultural idiom that divides the world into 
discrete nations—has dominated commemorative practices around the world. Given the dominance of nationalist 
commemoration, much of the sociological research on collective memory has assumed the nation as a unit of 
analysis and examined how people commemorate the past to create national identity (Halbwachs 1992; Olick 
2003; Schwartz 1991; Spillman 1997). When people commemorate the past according to the logic of nationalism, 
they often focus on what happened to their conationals by minimizing the presence of the foreign other in both the 
process and content of commemoration. 
In recent years, however, a group of sociologists pointed out the emergence of cosmopolitan commemoration, a 
new form of commemoration that takes humanity, rather than nationality, as a primary frame of reference (Beck, 
Levy, and Sznaider 2009; Levy and Sznaider 2006, 2010). As cosmopolitanism is increasingly institutionalized in 
the form of human rights around the world, they argue, the horizon of commemoration appears to be extending 
beyond national borders. But, at the same time, the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration is not replacing the 
existing nationalist logic in a zero-sum manner. Instead, cosmopolitanism articulates with nationalism in a 
complex manner because the latter persists as a legitimate organizing principle of social life (Beck 2005; Beck 
and Sznaider 2006). Thus, these recent studies raised an important new question for the sociology of collective 
memory: how does cosmopolitan commemoration emerge and articulate with nationalist commemoration? 
To answer this question, we examine the so-called “history problem” between Japan and South Korea that 
evolved after the Asia-Pacific War had ended in August 1945. The history problem is a set of controversies over 
how the Japanese government should commemorate its past colonial rule and wartime atrocities against Koreans 
(Lind 2008; Shin, Park, and Yang 2007). During much of the postwar period, the Japanese government, 
dominated by nationalist politicians and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), defended the logic of 
nationalism to commemorate Japanese war dead as martyrs without regard for the sufferings of foreign victims. 
Over the past few decades, however, the Japanese government begun to adopt cosmopolitan commemoration of 
South Korean and other foreign victims while maintaining nationalist commemoration. Thus, the nearly 70-year-
long history of the history problem offers extensive data for exploration of the mechanisms through which 
cosmopolitan commemoration emerges and articulates with nationalist commemoration. 
In light of our historical analysis, we argue that a synthesis of theories of institutional logics and social 
movements (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012) is useful in explaining the 
emergence of cosmopolitanism and its articulation with nationalism. In the case of the history problem, 
cosmopolitan commemoration emerged within a transnational network of political and civic actors, including, but 
not limited to, Japanese and South Korean A-bomb victims and NGOs and political parties that supported them: 
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these networks operated as “mobilizing structures” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996) for the cosmopolitan 
logic of commemoration. Moreover, when and how cosmopolitanism was articulated with nationalism in Japan’s 
official commemoration depended on shifting “political opportunities” (D. S. Meyer and Minkoff 2004) available 
for the transnational and other competing networks aligned differently with the two logics of commemoration. We 
also suggest that research on the history problem as a “transnational difficult past” (Kim and Schwartz 2010) will 
help the sociology of collective memory advance in a more relational direction by illuminating how 
commemoration mediates not only group-identity formation but also intergroup relations in a global world. 
The Emergence of Cosmopolitan Commemoration 
Generally speaking, the sociology of collective memory has focused on single and comparative case studies of 
how people commemorate past events to construct collective autobiographical narratives as constitutive of 
national identities (Halbwachs 1992; Olick 2003; Schwartz 1991; Spillman 1997). The nation has been a primary 
unit of analysis because nationalism has been dominant as an institutional logic to organize a wide variety of 
practices in the modern world (Calhoun 1997; A. Smith 2001). When people adopt nationalism as a logic of 
commemoration, they tend to focus on what happened to their conationals as well as allow only their conationals 
to participate in commemoration. Nationalist commemoration therefore excludes foreign others from both the 
process and content of commemoration. 
Recently, however, the increasing number of sociologists argues that cosmopolitanism has begun to emerge in 
practices and institutions around the world (Beck 2006; Delanty 2009; Holton 2009; Nowicka and Rovisco 2009). 
For these sociologists, cosmopolitanism is not a philosophical ideal but an actually existing empirical 
phenomenon, an orientation of openness to foreign others and cultures within the horizon of common humanity. 
Specifically, some of these sociologists of cosmopolitanism called into question the linkage between collective 
memory and the nation by proposing to explore how collective memory could become “cosmopolitan” (Beck et 
al. 2009; Levy and Sznaider 2006, 2010). They used the Holocaust commemoration as a case study to suggest that 
globalization of a human-rights discourse serves as a vehicle of cosmopolitan commemoration, wherein people 
transcend national borders by 
acknowledging the history (and the memories) of the “other” and integrating them into one’s own history . . . 
where the national monologues of victimization that are celebrated as national memory are systematically 
replaced by transnational forms and forums of memory and dialogue. (Beck 2005:43) 
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Put another way, by adopting the logic of cosmopolitanism, people can doubly include foreign others in 
commemoration: they remember what happened to foreign others as members of humanity while inviting them to 
participate in the process of shaping the content of commemoration. 
But this theory of cosmopolitan commemoration leaves two related questions unanswered. First, it does not 
adequately specify the mechanisms through which cosmopolitan commemoration emerges. To be sure, the theory 
suggests that globalization of a human-rights discourse enables cosmopolitan commemoration. This suggestion, 
however, not only relies on the case study of the Holocaust commemoration alone but also downplays potential 
negative effects of globalization of a human-rights discourse on cosmopolitanism. For example, globalization of a 
human-rights discourse allows nationalists in one country to claim their own victimhood to evade their 
responsibility for atrocities that they committed against people in another country. Moreover, as globalization of a 
human-rights discourse authorizes people to criticize commemorative practices in other countries, it can 
foreground how people in different countries commemorate the same event differently, which in turn can cause 
international conflicts—just like the history problem between Japan and South Korea. Put another way, 
globalization of a human-rights discourse “does not automatically produce cosmopolitan sentiments. It can just as 
naturally give rise to the opposite, to the rebirth of ethnic nationalism” (Beck 2003:27). In fact, cosmopolitanism 
may have nothing to do with globalization, to begin with (Robertson and Krossa 2012). 
Second, the theory of cosmopolitan commemoration does not explain how people articulate cosmopolitanism with 
nationalism in their commemorative practices. Even though nationalism has lost its primordial character in recent 
decades, it continues to operate as an institutional logic that legitimates organizations, practices, and schemas 
based on the idea of the nation (J. W. Meyer 2000; Soysal 1994). For example, while the UN organizations and 
international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) promote human rights, national governments are still 
responsible for implementing them in education systems and other societal institutions. Similarly, while 
membership in humanity is emphasized, national citizenship continues to play an important role in organizing 
economic, political, and social activities. Although the theory of cosmopolitan commemoration recognizes that 
“cosmopolitanism does not only negate nationalism but also presupposes it” (Beck and Sznaider 2006:20), this 
“both/and” formulation falls short on clarifying precisely how people actually negotiate the contradiction between 
the two logics in their commemorative practices. 
In sum, the theory of cosmopolitan commemoration has yet to specify how people come to adopt 
cosmopolitanism to open up the process and content of their commemoration to foreign others and how, in doing 
so, they negotiate the contradiction between the cosmopolitan and nationalist logics of commemoration. 
Although Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2006:148) stated that the way cosmopolitanism emerges and 
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articulates with nationalism in commemoration is ultimately “dependent on political contingencies,” we believe 
that it is not only possible but also important to try to specify the mechanisms of cosmopolitan commemoration if 
we are to advance the research on the changing nature of collective memory in the contemporary world. 
Institutional Logics and Social Movements 
To this end, we propose to build on a synthesis of theories of institutional logics and social movements recently 
suggested by a group of sociologists (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; H. Saito 2011; Thornton et al. 2012). On 
one hand, theory of institutional logics (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Friedland and Alford 1991) focuses on 
delineating existing logics and their contradictions on the institutional dimension while bypassing the interactional 
and organizational question of how actors mobilize collective actions around competing logics to challenge and 
change existing structures. On the other hand, theory of social movements (Goodwin and Jasper 2009; McAdam 
et al. 1996; Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2007) tends to focus on specific meaning-making processes, such as framing, 
at the interactional and organizational levels without fully connecting them to “deep” cultural idioms operative at 
the institutional level. The recently proposed synthesis of the two theories, however, aims to overcome these 
limitations by enabling each theory’s strength to cancel the other’s weakness. 
We believe that the synthesis of theories of institutional logics and social movements can indeed provide a 
promising point of departure for two reasons. First, cosmopolitanism and nationalism can be conceptualized as 
institutional logics that arrange commemorative practices—involving mnemonic schemas and objects—around 
“humanity” and “nationality,” respectively. Put somewhat differently, cosmopolitanism and nationalism are 
cultural idioms that allow actors to coherently organize distinct commemorative practices, ranging from memorial 
ceremonies to museums. Second, the content and trajectory of articulation of the two logics can be systematically 
analyzed in terms of political struggles among different groups—different mobilizing structures and political 
opportunities available to them in promoting their versions of the past—rather than prematurely invoking 
“political contingencies.” In fact, a few sociologists of collective memory began to borrow analytical tools from 
social movement studies and illustrated their usefulness (Armstrong and Crage 2006; Tsutsui 2006). Thus, the 
synthesis of theories of institutional logics and social movements has the potential to link organizational analysis 
of political struggles over commemoration with institutional analysis of culturally deep logics of commemoration. 
But, at the same time, as this synthesis was proposed only recently, it remains to be seen how the synthesis can be 
fully worked out and utilized to theorize the mechanisms through which cosmopolitan commemoration emerges 
and articulates with nationalist commemoration. 
The Historical Evolution of the History Problem 
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To explore the usefulness of the proposed theoretical synthesis, we examine the “history problem” between Japan 
and South Korea, a set of controversies over how the Japanese government should commemorate Japan’s past 
colonial rule and wartime atrocities against Koreans, ranging from issues of apology and compensation to history 
textbooks (Lind 2008; Shin et al. 2007). Given its protracted nature, the history problem has generated extensive 
data on how relevant political and civic actors—the people, NGOs, and governments of Japan and South Korea—
adopted different logics of commemoration and how they competed for influence over the Japanese government’s 
official commemoration. In the following sections, we present the historical evolution of the history problem from 
1945 through 2010 by dividing it into four periods corresponding to major changes in the Japanese government’s 
official commemoration of Japan’s past colonial rule and wartime atrocities against Koreans. Our analytical 
strategy is to construct detailed descriptions of the historical evolution of the history problem because detailed 
descriptions based on a case study are generally conducive to theorizing mechanisms of understudied phenomena 
(Abbott 2001; Ragin 1994). 
National Fragmentation, 1945–1964 
Soon after Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers in August 1945, Koreans began to demand various forms of 
compensation. Workers demanded pensions and unpaid wages from Japanese companies in Korea as well as 
compensation for those who had gone to work in Japan and suffered under severe working conditions (Takasaki 
1996). Families of Korean soldiers who had fought for Japan also formed associations to demand compensation 
from the Japanese government (Ōta 2003). The South Korean government, established in August 1948, was keen 
to demand compensation from Japan as well. But no diplomatic relations existed between Japan and South Korea 
because the latter was excluded from the San Francisco Peace Treaty that the former signed to normalize it 
relations with the Allied Powers in 1951. Shielded from South Korean commemorations, the majority of the 
Japanese commemorated the Asia-Pacific War mostly in terms of their own sufferings and developed “victim 
consciousness” (Orr 2001). 
While commemorations of the Asia-Pacific War remained fragmented along national borders, two important 
political developments occurred in Japan. First, nationalist politicians returned to power after the United States 
shifted its policy objectives from thorough democratization and demilitarization to quick reconstruction and 
rearmament of Japan—a policy shift widely known as a “reverse course.” As Japan began to rebuild its military 
capability and regained sovereignty, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru visited the Yasukuni Shrine in October 1951 
for the first time since the end of the war. Although Yasukuni lost its government sponsorship after the war, it 
continued to honor Japanese war dead as martyrs and justify the Asia-Pacific War as a sacred war to defend Japan 
and Asia against Western imperialism (Tanaka 2002). Nationalist politicians then consolidated their power in 
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November 1955 by merging two conservative parties into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). LDP members 
included former Class A war criminals and enjoyed strong support from the Japan Bereaved Families Association 
(JBFA) that demanded government sponsorship to be reinstated for the Yasukuni Shrine. To affirm nationalism as 
the logic of Japan’s official commemoration, LDP prime ministers regularly visited Yasukuni and pressed the 
Ministry of Education (MOE) to emphasize patriotism in school curricula (H. Saito 2011). 
In the meantime, the opposition, including the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), sided with victims of the atomic 
bombings and began to interrogate the Japanese government’s responsibility for the Asia-Pacific War. Although 
commemorations of the atomic bombings reinforced Japanese people’s focus on their own victimhood, they also 
fostered cosmopolitanism toward foreign others. In August 1955, A-bomb victims and antinuclear NGOs held the 
first world conference against nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and declared, “We must hasten to save them [atomic 
and hydrogen bombs] through worldwide movements . . . We plead to the world that peoples transcend their 
political, religious, and social differences and promote anti-nuclear movements ever more vigorously” (reprinted 
in Iwadare 1999:151–52). At annual peace memorial ceremonies, mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki also 
addressed people around the world, pleading for world peace and expressing solidarity with victims of armed 
conflicts abroad.1 Yet, incipient cosmopolitanism based on the commemoration of the atomic bombings was 
limited at the time: it failed to encompass Asian victims who had suffered from Japan’s past aggression, wartime 
atrocities, and colonial rule. 
In sum, in the immediate postwar period, the Japanese government adopted nationalist commemoration of the 
Asia-Pacific War by focusing on Japanese war dead without regard for Korean victims of Japan’s past colonial 
rule and wartime atrocities. This was not only because the South Korean government and people lacked 
connections with the Japanese government but also because political and civic actors promoting nationalism—the 
LDP, the JBFA, and the Yasukuni Shrine—dominated the Japanese government. Although the opposition parties 
and antinuclear NGOs rallied behind A-bomb victims to begin articulating the cosmopolitan logic of 
commemoration, they lacked control over the government and therefore could not exert influence over Japan’s 
official commemoration. Here, by drawing on social movement studies, we can say that nationalist 
commemoration was dominant because it had more robust “mobilizing structures” (McAdam et al. 1996) and 
favorable “political opportunities” (D. S. Meyer and Minkoff 2004) than did cosmopolitan commemoration. The 
nationalist network of the LDP, the JBFA, and the Yasukuni Shrine could mobilize a much larger number of 
supporters than the network of NGOs and political parties that supported A-bomb victims. Moreover, the 
Occupation’s “reverse course” to quickly rebuild Japan as an ally of the United States in the Cold War created 
political opportunities favorable to the comeback of nationalist politicians and their dominance of the Japanese 
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government. Nevertheless, the network of political and civic actors aligned with A-bomb victims and their 
cosmopolitan logic of commemoration was going to play a crucial role in creating a transnational network of 
political parties and NGOs after Japan normalized its relations with South Korea in 1965. 
The Growth of Transnational Connections, 1965–1988 
On June 22, 1965, the Japanese and South Korean governments signed the Treaty on Basic Relations, which made 
no reference to Japan’s past colonial rule and wartime atrocities. The treaty also dodged disagreements between 
the Japanese and South Korean governments in terms of how to commemorate the past: the two sides agreed to 
disagree about interpretation of the treaty’s second article that read, “All treaties or agreements concluded 
between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and 
void.”2 The Japanese side interpreted the article to mean that the 1910 Japan–Korean Annexation Treaty had been 
once valid but become null and void when the Republic of Korea was founded in August 1948. In contrast, the 
South Korean side interpreted it to mean that the Annexation Treaty had never been valid. Members of the 
opposition parties in Japan criticized the normalization treaty for dodging the issues regarding the history of 
Japan–Korea relations. The JSP member Narazaki Yanosuke, for example, argued that the government’s 
interpretation of the second article tried to undermine South Korea’s compensation claims and ignore the history 
of the Korean people’s resistance against Japan’s colonial rule.3 Members of the opposition parties in South Korea 
also rejected the second article as “it provided a basis for requiring the South Korean side to completely renounce 
its compensation claims . . . and for retrospectively accepting Japan’s imperialism” (reprinted in Takasaki 
1996:182–84). 
Even though the Japanese and South Korean governments were silent on Japan’s past colonial rule and wartime 
atrocities, the normalization treaty nonetheless opened channels of interaction between Japanese and South 
Korean nongovernmental actors. In May 1965, Mindan, a Korean resident union in Japan, sent delegations to 
South Korea to investigate conditions of South Korean A-bomb victims. In response to Mindan’s visit, the South 
Korean Red Cross Society conducted a survey and found more than 400 A-bomb victims. Then, South Korean A-
bomb victims established the A-bomb Victims Association in July 1967. Association members staged a small 
demonstration in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul in November 1967, demanding compensation from the 
Japanese government (Ichiba 2005). While the Japanese government rejected the compensation claim by South 
Korean A-bomb victims, nongovernmental actors in Japan began organizing relief activities. In December 1967 
and August 1968, high school students in Hiroshima and businessmen in Nagasaki, respectively, raised and sent 
relief funds to South Korean A-bomb victims (Takenaka 1970). The Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen 
Bombs, affiliated with the JSP and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), also decided to survey conditions of Korean 
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A-bombs in Japan in December 1967, while the National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons 
decided to provide reliefs for South Korean A-bomb victims in August 1968 (Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai Shimin 
Kaigi 1988). 
In the meantime, the issue of South Korean A-bomb victims began to involve a wider circle of political actors. In 
August 1971, the South Korean A-bomb Victims Association sent a petition to Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and 
asked the Japanese government to treat Korean A-bomb victims equally as their Japanese counterparts. In August 
1972, Shin Yong Su, a president of the Association, met with Deputy Prime Minister Miki Takeo to hand a 
petition to Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, requesting the Japanese government to compensate South Korean A-
bomb victims (Ienaga, Odagiri, and Kuroko 1991). These lobbying activities by South Korean A-bomb victims 
were supported by the Japanese opposition parties. The JSP member Ohara Toru from Hiroshima argued that the 
Japanese government should take actions to help South Korean A-bomb victims “from a humanitarian standpoint 
because Japan mobilized those Koreans in the first place, and Japan also has more experience of providing relief 
and medical treatment for A-bomb victims.”4 Another JSP member Nakamura Jūkū from Nagasaki also pressed 
the government to provide compensation for South Korean A-bomb victims: “Really, Koreans were forcibly taken 
to Japan and forced to bear enormous damages. We must try to provide at least some government compensation 
for the people who suffered from the war that Japan had started.”5 
Despite the growth of cosmopolitan commemoration within the transnational network of Japanese political parties 
and NGOs aligned with South Korean A-bomb victims, nationalism remained dominant in the Japanese 
government’s official commemoration. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, all LDP prime ministers visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine. The LDP also proposed to reinstate government sponsorship for Yasukuni five times between 
1969 and 1974. Although these “Yasukuni Bills” failed to pass the Diet due to strong oppositions, Yasukuni 
officials proceeded to enshrine 14 Class A war criminals, including Tojo Hideki, as martyrs in 1978 to justify the 
Asia-Pacific War as a heroic act of self-defense (Tanaka 2002). 
Precisely because nationalism remained dominant in Japan’s official commemoration, however, Japan’s relations 
with South Korea were rocked by a series of history-textbook controversies in the 1980s. During the 1982 
inspection of textbooks for high schools, MOE textbook inspectors recommended that authors of Japanese history 
textbooks should use expressions to downplay Japan’s past aggression and wartime atrocities.6 The news of the 
textbook inspection drew intense criticisms from NGOs and governments in South Korea, China, and other Asian 
countries (He 2009; Lind 2008). The international criticisms continued until the MOE issued a statement in 
November 1982 to promise a new textbook-inspection criterion to promote “international understanding and 
cooperation in light of our past unfortunate relations with South Korea, China, and other neighboring countries in 
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Asia.”7 The MOE then incorporated the so-called “article on neighboring countries” into its textbook-inspection 
criteria to encourage descriptions of how foreigners had suffered in the Asia-Pacific War. 
Moreover, when South Korea’s president Chun Doo Hwan made the first-ever presidential visit to Japan in 
September 1984, the opposition parties pressed Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro to use this occasion to offer a 
clear apology to South Korea. The JSP member Yaoi Tadashi stated, “Japan has committed so many wrongs 
against Korea that no apology can make up . . . I believe the government should offer a clear and official apology 
to the Korean people on the occasion of President Chun’s visit.”8 At the welcome dinner party for Chun, 
Nakasone did not offer an “apology (shazai)” but expressed his “deep regret (fukai ikan)” for “serious damages 
that Japan inflicted” and stated Japan’s determination not to repeat the same wrongs. Emperor Hirohito, too, 
expressed his “regret for the unfortunate past” between the two countries.9 
In short, after Japan and South Korea normalized their relations in 1965, the history problem between the two 
countries began to develop: normalization opened both governmental and nongovernmental channels of 
interaction between the two countries, exposing disjunctive commemorations of their past relations. In this 
process, Japanese political and civic actors who had adopted cosmopolitanism to commemorate the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki played a key role. They extended solidarities to South Korean A-bomb 
victims, who had been victims of Japan’s past colonial rule and wartime atrocities, by offering them relief and 
organizational support for their efforts to press the Japanese government for apology and compensation. Put 
another way, mobilizing structures for the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration expanded during this period 
since the transnational network emerged that included Japanese and South Korean A-bomb victims as well as 
NGOs and political parties that supported them. Moreover, political opportunities began to shift at the 
international level. As Japan’s official commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War began to draw international 
attention, nationalist politicians who dominated the Japanese government had to consider incorporating the 
cosmopolitan logic of commemoration if they wanted to avoid diplomatic disputes. In fact, during this period, the 
Japanese government officially expressed “regret” for Japan’s past colonial rule and wartime atrocities against 
Koreans and modified the textbook-inspection criteria to teach more extensively how Japan had victimized people 
in Asia-Pacific. At the same time, the nationalist logic of commemoration continued to be supported by robust 
mobilizing structures and favorable political opportunities thanks to the LDP’s political dominance and lobbying 
activities by members of the JBFA and supporters of the Yasukuni Shrine. As a result, nationalist commemoration 
remained dominant, even though cosmopolitan commemoration began to acquire more robust mobilizing 
structures and favorable political opportunities and push the content of Japan’s official commemoration in a 
slightly more cosmopolitan direction. 
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Apologies and Denunciations, 1989–1995 
Toward the 50th anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War, cosmopolitanism continued to increase its 
presence in public commemorations in Japan through the network of political and civic actors that supported 
Japanese and South Korean A-bomb victims. In his peace declaration on August 9, 1990, for example, mayor of 
Nagasaki City Motoshima Hitoshi called for an “apology (shazai)” and relief to “Korean and Chinese people who 
were forcibly taken to Japan and treated inhumanely under Japan’s brutal colonial rule—and killed by the atomic 
bomb.”10 This was the first time either Nagasaki or Hiroshima City officially commemorated foreign A-bomb 
victims in relation to Japan’s past aggression, wartime atrocities, and colonial rule. Then, in August 1991, Hiraoka 
Takashi, a newly elected Hiroshima mayor, followed Motoshima’s example and stated, “Japan caused enormous 
sufferings and sorrows among people in Asia-Pacific through its colonial rule and war. We are sorry for 
it.”11 These changes in the Japanese commemoration of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 
coterminous with efforts by Japanese and foreign NGOs. One year after the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989, 
various symposiums on Japan’s wartime atrocities were organized in Hiroshima. One of the largest ones took 
place in August 1990, hosted by the JSP-affiliated Japan Congress Against A- and H-bombs. At the symposium, 
Iwamatsu Shigetoshi, a Japanese A-bomb victim from Nagasaki, bowed his head and offered a “deep apology” to 
foreign war victims because he came to realize that “without thorough self-criticism of Japan’s atrocious crime, 
the invasion of Asia-Pacific, our antinuclear movement would be a sham.” After hearing his apology, 
representatives of foreign NGOs went up to him and shook hands. In particular, Yi Woo Jung, a president of the 
Korean Church Women United who had actively supported South Korea A-bomb victims, stated, “I heard an 
apology from an A-bomb victim for the first time. This made me hopeful that we can create one common 
world.”12 
Then, in November 1990, the Korean Church Women United, the Korean Women’s Associations United, and 35 
other women’s associations created the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by 
Japan. The purpose of the Council was to support former comfort women. The JSP member Shimizu Sumiko soon 
relayed the Council’s petition to the Diet: the petition demanded the Japanese government to offer apologies and 
compensation for former comfort women as well as teach the issue in history education so as not to repeat similar 
wrongs in the future.13 While the Japanese government initially denied its involvement in the system of comfort 
women, three former comfort women and a group of South Koreans who had served in the Japanese military filed 
a joint lawsuit against the Japanese government at the Tokyo District Court in December 1991. With the help of 
Japanese lawyers from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, they demanded that the Japanese government 
should offer apologies and compensation.14 
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When the transnational network of political parties and NGOs was pressing the Japanese government to 
commemorate and compensate South Korea victims, the LDP was ousted from power in August 1993. Then, 
Hosokawa Morihito of Japan New Party became the first non-LDP prime minister since 1955 by heading a 
coalition of eight parties, including the JSP. As soon as Hosokawa was sworn into office, he began revising the 
way the Japanese government had commemorated the Asia-Pacific War. At the press conference on August 11, 
Hosokawa stated that the Asia-Pacific War “was a war of aggression, and I see it as a mistaken war.”15 This was 
the first time Japan’s prime minister clearly acknowledged that Japan’s aggression had caused the war. At the 
National Memorial Service for the War Dead on August 15, too, Hosokawa extended his “condolences to war 
victims and their bereaved families beyond national borders—to those in neighboring Asian countries and around 
the world.”16 
Immediately, the LDP criticized Hosokawa for defining Japan as the aggressor in the Asia-Pacific War. On the 
next day of the August 11 press conference, LDP members who had strong connections with the JBFA and the 
Yasukuni Shrine went to the Prime Minister’s Office to ask Hosokawa to retract his statement on the war of 
aggression. These LDP members also held a joint meeting on August 13 to denounce Hosokawa’s statement that 
represented “the Tokyo Trial historical view” that had judged Japan solely and entirely guilty of the war while 
exempting the Allied Powers from prosecution of their war crimes (Rekishi Kentou Iinkai 1995). The LDP 
member Itagaki Takashi, who had served as an adviser to the JBFA, went as far as to argue that Hosokawa 
“repeatedly said Japan invaded Asia, but really, Japan liberated Asia. Without the Greater East Asia War, could 
Asia have been liberated from colonial rule by the West?”17 
In spite of these criticisms from LDP members, Hosokawa continued to steer the Japanese government’s 
commemoration away from the logic of nationalism. When he visited South Korea in November 1993, he 
expressed his “heartfelt remorse” and offered a “deep apology” by acknowledging “Japan’s colonial rule” that had 
forced Koreans to “adopt Japanese names and work as ‘comfort women’ and forced laborers.”18 But Hosokawa’s 
eight-party coalition soon faltered, as disagreements among coalition partners began to intensify. To return to 
power, the LDP made a deal with the JSP and the New Party Sakigake. The JSP agreed to form a coalition with 
the LDP, its long-standing archrival, after the LDP offered a position of prime minister for the JSP chairman 
Murayama Tomiichi. 
Once the JSP became a part of the coalition government in June 1994, it pressed the issue of government 
compensation for A-bomb victims. The nature of relief for A-bomb victims was critical for the Japanese 
government because it was integral to the existing nationalist commemoration that justified the Asia-Pacific War: 
if the nature of relief for A-bomb victims were defined as compensatory, the Japanese government would have to 
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acknowledge that the war had been wrong in harming people’s lives. To defend nationalist commemoration, the 
LDP strongly opposed the JSP’s attempt to compensate A-bomb victims. Even though the JSP had the post of 
prime minister, the LDP was by far the largest of the three coalition partners. In the end, the JSP compromised 
with the LDP by accepting the latter’s proposal to include “government responsibility (kuni no sekinin),” instead 
of “government compensation (kokka hoshō),” in a relief bill for A-bomb victims. The phrase “government 
responsibility” meant that the government should take responsibility for providing relief for A-bomb victims, but 
this responsibility was not compensatory. 
Between 1994 and 1995, the JSP compromised with the LDP on two other issues regarding how to commemorate 
the Asia-Pacific War. One was a Diet resolution to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of the war. 
Initially, the JSP and the LDP took diametrically opposed positions. While the former wanted to include a clear 
apology for Japan’s past aggression, wartime atrocities, and colonial rule, the latter wanted to honor those who 
had fought and died for Japan. As the 50th anniversary approached, the JSP and the LDP engaged in intense 
negotiations over the nature and language of a Diet resolution, which resulted in a compromise that favored the 
LDP’s position (Hatano 2011). Moreover, the JSP and the LDP compromised on the issue of former comfort 
women. The JSP initially planned to create a fund for a wide variety of foreign victims of the Asia-Pacific War by 
holding the government and the public each responsible for a half of the fund. The motivating idea behind this 
plan was to involve not only the government but also Japanese citizens as the author of atonement (Ōnuma, 
Shimomura, and Wada 1998). But the plan met strong oppositions from the majority of LDP members and 
officials of Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs who insisted that all issues of compensation had been 
already resolved upon normalization of diplomatic relations. As a result, instead of mandating the government to 
contribute a half of the fund as originally proposed, Murayama’s coalition government decided to take 
responsibility for expenses of managing the fund’s activities, such as staff salaries and advertisement costs. 
Japanese citizens were then asked to take responsibility for making actual monetary contributions to be used as 
“atonement money” for former comfort women (Ōnuma 2007). 
While the Diet resolution and the Asian Women’s Fund were compromised by the LDP, Murayama tried to offer 
an official apology as a prime minister. He consulted with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in drafting 
his statement and persuaded LDP members in his cabinet to approve it (Murayama 2011). Given the unanimous 
approval by his cabinet member, Murayama issued the following apology as the Japanese government’s official 
position on August 15, 1995. Murayama acknowledged how Japan “through its colonial rule and aggression, 
caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations,” 
and went on to “express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.”19 
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Thus, between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, cosmopolitanism was incorporated into Japan’s official 
commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War. The transnational network promoting cosmopolitan commemoration 
was expanded when former comfort women and other South Korean victims of Japan’s past colonial rule and 
wartime atrocities, as well as NGOs that supported them, joined forces with A-bomb victims and their supporters. 
This expansion of mobilizing structures for the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration was facilitated by the 
growing international political opportunity in the early 1990s in conjunction with worldwide attention to war 
crimes and human-rights violations in ethnic conflicts in Africa and Eastern Europe (Soh 2008; Tsutsui 2006). 
The growing mobilizing structures and international political opportunity then combined with the domestic 
political opportunity that allowed the JSP to become part of the coalition government in 1994. As a result, the 
transnational network of Japanese and South Korean political and civic actors succeeded in making Japan’s 
official commemoration significantly more cosmopolitan than before. At the same time, however, the LDP 
retained its power within the coalition government and attenuated the transnational network’s influence over 
Japan’s official commemoration, compromising the cosmopolitan and nationalist logics of commemoration. 
The Cosmopolitan-Nationalist Dialectic of the History Problem, 1996–2010 
Given the efforts by the non-LDP prime ministers to promote cosmopolitan commemoration, Japanese history 
textbooks increased descriptions of Japan’s past aggression, wartime atrocities, and colonial rule. All history 
textbooks approved for junior high schools in 1996, for example, included descriptions of comfort women. But 
this galvanized nationalist intellectuals to form the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (JSHTR). In its 
statement of purpose issued in January 1997, the JSHTR declared to promote a “balanced” history education to 
teach both successes and mistakes in Japan’s history: 
History education in the postwar period led Japanese people to ignore Japanese culture and tradition . . . to lose 
their national pride. Especially the modern historiography treats the Japanese people as if they were criminals 
who must continue to atone and apologize forever.20 
The increased amount of descriptions of Japan’s past aggression, wartime atrocities, and colonial rule in history 
textbooks also galvanized LDP members. In February 1997, 87 relatively young LDP members established the 
Association of Young Diet Members for Examining Japan’s Future and History Education. To examine “what 
Japanese textbooks should be for the sake of the Japanese people,” the Association organized nine seminars by 
inviting government officials who had been involved in the issue of comfort women under Hosokawa’s 
government, MOE officials who administered textbook-inspection processes, and university professors, among 
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others (Nihon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōiku wo Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai 1997): 3 out of the 18 guest 
speakers were JSHTR members. 
While strengthening connections with the LDP, the JSHTR teamed up with Fusosha, a conservative publishing 
company, to produce a draft history textbook for junior high schools and established branches in all 48 prefectures 
to advertise its textbook. Next, in April 2000, the JSHTR submitted its draft textbook History of the Japanese 
People to the inspection process of the MOE and began lobbying local boards of education to adopt its textbook. 
In the meantime, LDP members in local councils formed associations to support the Society (Tawara 2001). Then, 
in December 2000, the MOE asked Fusosha to make 137 revisions as a precondition for approval of its history 
textbook. Many of the required revisions pertained to sentences that downplayed Japan’s past aggression, wartime 
atrocities, and colonial rule while emphasizing the importance of patriotism. The sentences marked for required 
revisions included, “Japan annexed Korea legally according to the international law at the time,” and “Kamikaze 
soldiers did not hesitate to sacrifice their lives for Japan” (Kodomo to Kyōkasho Zenkoku Netto 21 2001) After 
the JSHTR made necessary revisions, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
(MEXT)—the MOE reformed and renamed in January 2001—approved its history textbook in April 2001. 
Over the next few years, a diplomatic tension between Japan and South Korea grew and reached its climax in 
2005. While the JSHTR continued to promote its nationalist history textbook, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro 
made annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in spite of both domestic and international criticisms. At this juncture, 
the Shimane Prefectural Council proposed a bill in February 2005 to designate February 22 as a day to celebrate 
the incorporation of Takeshima/Dokto into Japan’s territory. This prompted President Roh Moo Hyun to strongly 
criticize Japan at the memorial ceremony to celebrate Korean resistance against Japan’s colonial rule on March 1: 
Although the South Korean government has refrained from fueling the people’s anger and hatred, it cannot 
solve the history problem by itself . . . Japan should investigate historical truths and truly express remorse and 
offer apologies as well as compensate.21 
Moreover, according to the joint opinion survey by Asahi Shinbun and Dong-A Ilbo in March 2005, 63 percent of 
South Korean respondents disliked Japan. The survey also showed how differently people in Japan and South 
Korea commemorated the past: 66 percent of Japanese regarded the Yasukuni Shrine as a place to commemorate 
war dead, whereas 61 percent of South Koreans regarded it as a symbol of militarism; and 43 percent of South 
Koreans thought that Japan’s apology was a key to resolve the history problem, whereas only 13 percent of 
Japanese thought so.22 
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In response to the escalating history problem, the Japan History Education Research Group and the South Korea 
History Textbook Research Group—NGOs consisting of historians and history teachers—began holding joint 
symposiums on Japanese and South Korean history textbooks in December 2007. The purpose of symposiums 
was to understand how Japanese and South Korean historians interpreted the history of relations between the two 
countries differently, as well as to explore the possibility of creating common teaching materials. One of the most 
important themes of these joint symposiums was to rethink a historiography centered on one’s country. As one of 
the participants Yi Chon Hee put it, “If teachers cannot avoid making lessons centered on history of their own 
country, it’s important for them to link their history to universality and cosmopolitanism, so that they can 
relativize and objectify their history to go beyond prejudices” (Rekishi Kyōiku Kenkyūkai 2000:29). In addition, 
in March 2002 and January 2003, the History Educationalist Conference of Japan and the South Korea National 
Association of History Teachers organized joint symposiums to explore lesson plans and materials for teaching 
history of relations between Japan and South Korea that could challenge nationalist biases in history education in 
the two countries.23 
These nongovernmental efforts culminated in the publication of the joint history textbook titled History that 
Opens the Future in May 2005. This joint history textbook by historians and history teachers from Japan, South 
Korea, and China examines Japan’s past aggression, wartime atrocities, and colonial rule more extensively than 
do typical Japanese history textbooks, while newly introducing details of Japan’s victim aspect, such as the 
atomic bombings, to South Korean and Chinese students (Nicchūkan Sangoku Kyōtsū Rekishikyōzai Iinkai 
2005). Throughout the joint project, Japanese, South Korea, and Chinese participants also critically reflected on 
their nationalist biases (K. Saito 2008). In the mid-2000s, other history textbooks also came out of similar 
collaborative efforts between Japanese and South Korean historians and history teachers in the mid-
2000s: Gender in Modern History of Japan and Korea by the Japan–South Korea Joint Commission for History 
Teaching Materials in 2005, Confrontation of Japanese and Korean Histories by the History Educationalist 
Conference of Japan and the South Korea National Associations of History Teachers in 2006, and History of 
Japan–Korea Relations by the Japan History Education Research Group and the South Korea History Textbook 
Research Group in 2007 (Chung 2011). 
Along with these nongovernmental joint projects, the Japanese and South Korean governments launched the Joint 
Historical Research Project in May 2002 based on the agreement that Prime Minister Koizumi made with 
President Kim Dae Jung during his visit to South Korea in October 2001. Each government commissioned 11 
historians. Between May 2002 and March 2005, the members of the project held meetings in both Japan and 
South Korea and published a final report in June 2006. The Japanese and South Korean governments then 
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launched the second round of the joint historical research project in June 2007. This time the governments 
expanded the project by creating a new subcommittee on history textbooks. The new subcommittee was also the 
largest, consisting of 12 members in total.24 They held multiple meetings in Japan and South Korea between June 
2007 and November 2009 and published a final report in March 2010. While historical research project was under 
way, the LDP lost decisively the general election in August 2009. In place of the LDP, the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) became the largest political party in the Diet and formed a coalition government with the Democratic 
Socialist Party (a successor of the JSP) and the People’s New Party in September 2009. Since then, the DPJ 
government continued to support the joint historical research project, and Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko and 
President Lee Myung Bak agreed to organize the third round of the joint historical research project during their 
summit meeting in December 2011. 
From 1995 through 2010, then, the Japanese government’s official commemoration maintained the compromise 
of cosmopolitanism and nationalism that had been institutionalized during the previous period. To be sure, 
nationalist politicians of the LDP and their supporters tried to strengthen nationalist commemoration by 
promoting a prime minister’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and the JSHTR’s nationalistic textbooks. But LDP 
politicians also instituted the governmental joint historical research projects in an attempt to correct nationalist 
biases in both Japanese and South Korean versions of history. Here, even though nationalist commemoration 
regained a domestic political opportunity thanks to the LDP’s return to power, it lacked a favorable international 
political opportunity because international relations between Japan and South Korea had developed to the extent 
that greater nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration could cause diplomatic problems (Berger 2012). To 
put it the other way around, cosmopolitanism remained in Japan’s official commemoration because its strong 
international political opportunity compensated its weak domestic political opportunity, that is, the demise of its 
longtime political ally, the JSP. Moreover, cosmopolitan commemoration continued to grow within the 
transnational network of Japanese and South Korean political and civic actors by newly incorporating historians 
and history teachers. In short, the compromise of cosmopolitan and nationalist logics of commemoration seemed 
to be firmly institutionalized in the Japanese government’s official commemoration by the end of the 2000s. 
 
The Mechanisms of Cosmopolitan Commemoration 
In light of the foregoing historical analysis, we suggest that the synthesis of theories of institutional logics and 
social movements can be fruitfully deployed for theorizing the mechanisms through which cosmopolitan 
commemoration emerges and articulates with nationalist commemoration. During the first two periods (1945–
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1964, 1965–1988), robust mobilizing structures and favorable political opportunities existed for the nationalist 
logic of commemoration. As a result, nationalism dominated the Japanese government’s official commemoration 
of its past colonial rule and wartime atrocities against Koreans. During the remaining periods (1989–1995, 1996–
2010), however, mobilizing structures and political opportunities expanded for the cosmopolitan logic of 
commemoration, which led to the compromise of cosmopolitanism and nationalism in Japan’s official 
commemoration. Table 1 summarizes the history of changing mobilizing structures and political opportunities for 
the two different logics of commemoration. 
Table 1. Mobilizing Structure and Political Opportunity for Two Logics of Commemoration. 
 
The foregoing analysis also allows us to propose conceptual refinement for both the sociology of 
cosmopolitanism and the synthesis of institutional logics and social movements. With regard to the sociology of 
cosmopolitanism, we have shown that cosmopolitanism is not “simply a free-floating cultural taste, personal 
attitude, or ethical choice” (Calhoun 2008:109) but always embedded in specific networks of political and civic 
actors who have acquired cosmopolitan orientations for a variety of reasons. These transnational networks are 
typically mobilized by a group of “rooted cosmopolitans,” those who are based in single countries but endowed 
with openness to foreign others as members of humanity (Appiah 2006; Beck 2003; Tarrow 2005). In the case of 
the history problem, Japanese A-bomb victims, as well as NGOs and political parties that supported them, formed 
the first group of rooted cosmopolitans: they adopted cosmopolitanism to commemorate the atomic bombings as 
relevant to all of humanity and extended solidarities to all war victims around the world. Once Japan normalized 
its relations with South Korea in 1965, they transposed the cosmopolitan logic to commemorate the sufferings of 
South Korean A-bomb victims as well as other South Korean victims of Japan’s past colonial rule and wartime 
atrocities. Then, Japanese NGOs that supported former comfort women and other South Korean victims joined the 
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transnational network as the second group of rooted cosmopolitans in the 1990s, followed by the third group of 
rooted cosmopolitans, historians and history teachers who launched joint historical research and textbook projects 
from the late 1990s through the 2000s. Here, we suggest that transnational networks tend to reinforce 
cosmopolitan dispositions by creating mutually transformative “publics.” Generally speaking, “publics” refer to 
communicative sites where people from different social networks come into contact with one another, encounter 
different meaning-making practices and, consequently, transform their interpretative schemas and identities 
(Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Mische and White 1998). Transnational networks can facilitate such mutually 
transformative interactions because they tend to prioritize nationally unbounded identities, such as “war victims” 
and “historians,” over nationally bounded identities, such as “Japanese” and “South Korean,” enabling 
participants to extend identification beyond national borders (Anderson 1998). 
Moreover, when and how cosmopolitan commemoration articulates with nationalist commemoration depends on 
power relations, reflective of available mobilizing structures and political opportunities, between competing 
networks of political and civic actors aligned differently with the two logics of commemoration. An extreme 
outcome of this competition is the complete dominance of one over the other, but a typical outcome seems to be a 
compromise between the two. Here, we argue that a compromise between cosmopolitanism and nationalism tends 
to be vulnerable to denunciations and therefore unstable because it is characterized by what social theorists Luc 
Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (2006:226) called “the monstrosity of composite setups,” where “the coexistence 
of objects of different natures makes several groupings equally possible and creates uncertainty about the nature 
of the test under way.” A compromised arrangement tends to invite controversies because respective proponents 
of the competing logics could always contest the compromise by criticizing it for failing to conform adequately to 
one logic or another. This fundamental instability of a compromise may partially explain why the history problem 
intensified in the 1990s, precisely when the Japanese government began to compromise cosmopolitanism and 
nationalism in its official commemoration. 
With regard to the synthesis of institutional logics and social movements, we have shown that cosmopolitanism 
had different frames across different groups of rooted cosmopolitans. The first group of rooted cosmopolitans had 
a strong pacifist frame because they mobilized around the commemoration of the atomic bombings. 
Cosmopolitanism among those who supported former comfort women and other South Korean victims from the 
1990s onward had a clear human-rights frame because activities of UN and other intergovernmental organizations 
in response to human-rights violation in Africa and Eastern Europe increased the presence of a human-rights 
discourse in East Asia (Soh 2008; Tsutsui 2006). Then, cosmopolitanism among the third group of rooted 
cosmopolitans, historians and history teachers, had an epistemic frame: professionals like historians are important 
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agents of cosmopolitanism and “world culture” that takes the globe rather than the nation as a primary frame of 
reference because they form cognitively oriented transnational networks based on their universalistic schemas, 
practices, and identities (Boli and Thomas 1999; Drori, Meyer, and Hwang 2006; Lechner and Boli 2005). Indeed, 
the joint historical research and textbook projects by Japan and South Korea were modeled after the Joint 
German-Polish Textbook Commission and similar bilateral projects in other parts of the world (Shin and Sneider 
2011). Despite their limitations, these joint projects represent the worldwide trend to implement the logic of 
cosmopolitanism to open up the process and content of historical writing to foreign others. In this respect, it is 
important to recognize that the transnational network of rooted cosmopolitans in the history problem included not 
only activists but also historians, even though much of social movement studies focuses on the role of 
transnational solidarity networks generated by activists (Keck and Sikkink 1998; J. Smith, Chatfield, and 
Pagnucco 1997). In fact, cosmopolitan commemoration across Japan and South Korea was embedded in 
overlapping and heterogeneous—advocacy, civic, and epistemic—transnational networks of rooted cosmopolitans 
with different histories and norms. 
Conclusion and Implications 
In this article, we have examined the history problem to explore the mechanisms through which cosmopolitan 
commemoration emerges and articulates with nationalist commemoration. Specifically, we have illustrated how 
the synthesis of theories of institutional logics and social movements can help to theorize the mechanisms of 
cosmopolitan commemoration. The synthesis can illuminate how cosmopolitanism and nationalism are embedded 
in specific networks as mobilizing structures and how they can be institutionalized in a national government, 
depending on political opportunities available to those networks aligned differently with the two logics of 
commemoration. Put another way, politics of commemoration at interactional and organizational levels revolves 
around culturally deep, institutional logics of commemoration, while the latter are in turn reproduced and 
rearticulated through the former. 
In conclusion, we suggest that research on history problems can develop a new line of inquiry about the 
relationship between collective memory and intergroup relations. Although the sociology of collective memory 
has focused on how people commemorate the past to construct their group identities, collective memories are 
increasingly deployed not only to define group identities but also to mediate intergroup relations. At the 
international level, politicians often try to manipulate commemorations to control international relations to their 
own advantages, while their perceptions of international relations are in turn colored through their collective 
memories (Berger 2012; He 2009). Especially when commemorations of traumatic events are concerned, they are 
likely to burden international relations between former enemy countries with new tensions and even conflicts 
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because these commemorations are charged with intense emotion. Studying history problems—“difficult pasts” 
on a transnational scale—can therefore advance collective memory studies in a more relational direction. 
In this respect, it is important to note that any history problem is fundamentally a relational phenomenon. 
Although the Japanese government has been primarily responsible for causing the history problem by continuing 
to defend nationalism in its official commemoration, the history problem was also fueled by nationalist 
commemoration in South Korea (Lind 2008; Park 2008). By doubly excluding the foreign other—from both the 
process and content of commemoration—nationalism prompts people to embrace a certain version of the past as a 
foundation of their national identity. Thus, if nationalist commemorations come into contact with each other, they 
can cause intense controversies: a collision of contradictory versions of history, predicated on the negation of the 
foreign other, is a recipe for escalating mutual distrust and denunciation. This is how a historical problem, which 
is rather commonplace in itself, becomes an intractable point of contention in intergroup relations. 
To study how and why a history problem becomes intractable or moves toward its resolution, we suggest that 
comparison of various history problems will be helpful. The history problem between Japan and China over the 
Asia-Pacific War, for example, is different from its Japan–South Korea counterpart because China is not a 
democratic country and its NGO sector is underdeveloped. How the history problem unfolded between Germany 
and Poland over World War II was also different because it was placed within the context of European 
integration. Comparative research on different history problems across different geopolitical and historical 
contexts will likely help further clarify the mechanisms and processes through which rooted cosmopolitans create 
transnational networks as mobilizing structures of cosmopolitan commemoration, exploit political opportunities to 
compete with other networks for influence over official commemorations, and mediate international relations 
between countries. 
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Notes 
1. Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Declarations are compiled 
at http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/genre/0000000000000/1001000002122/index.html and http://www1.
city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp/peace/japanese/appeal/history/index.html (accessed March 1, 2012). 
2. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19650622.T1J.html (accessed March 1, 2012). 
3. House of Representatives Plenary Session, November 9, 1965. 
4. House of Representatives Social Labor Committee, October 11, 1972. 
5. House of Representatives Social Labor Committee, April 13, 1978. 
6. Asahi Shimbun, July 28, 1982. 
7. Minister of Education Ogawa’s Statement on History Textbooks, reprinted in Asahi Shinbun, November 24, 
1982. 
8. House of Councilors Foreign Affairs Committee, July 17, 1984. 
9. Asahi Shimbun, September 7, 1984. 
10. Nagasaki Peace Declaration, August 9, 1990. 
11. Hiroshima Peace Declaration, August 6, 1991. 
12. Asahi Shimbun, August 5, 1990. 
13. House of Councilors Foreign Affairs Committee, December 18, 1990. 
14. The plaintiffs’ claim is archived at http://www.awf.or.jp/4/lawsuit.html (accessed March 1, 2012). 
15. Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 1993. 
16. Asahi Shimbun, August 16, 1993. 
17. House of Councilors Cabinet Committee, November 9, 1993. 
18. Asahi Shimbun, November 6 and 7, 1993. 
19. http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html (accessed March 10, 2012). 
20. http://www.tsukurukai.com/aboutus/syuisyo.html (accessed March 10, 2012). 
21. Asahi Shimbun, March 1, 2005. 
22. Asahi Shimbun, April 27, 2005. 
23. http://www.jca.apc.org/rekkyo/html/katudou_b.html (retrieved on March 10, 2012). 
24. http://www.jkcf.or.jp/projects/kaigi/history/second/ (accessed March 1, 2012). 
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